Does lies in salvation? Whether a false happens for good, there is no lie for good.

Chapter Forty Four Mass Enemies of Narodi in the Red Army - harm to defense in the country in 41st or good? There are two opposite assessments of mass executions of the commanders and the Red Army Commissioners in 1937-1938. Picks Snapely written off each other

Does it really lie for the benefit? How can I justify the lie, said in the face? Proponents of honesty and openness definitely declare that they are nothing. Lie is a big sin on the soul and gravity on conscience. A man who dared to lie should then constantly remember his lies, look for her acknowledgment, which means to lie again and again. Get out of the vicious circle will be very hard and it would be better to immediately repent, tell the whole truth, clear the conscience.

When a lie - salvation

But life can not be driven into the frame only good or bad, it is multifaceted and is represented by a variety of shades. Therefore, those who think extremes and should be too strict principles, in the end, turn out to be a real dilemma. A lie refers to similar concepts. How can I say in the patient's bed that it remains to live for several months, if the hope of recovery is the only thing that helped him cope with the disease? And how to tell a little child that his mother is awkward to him? Or confess to the elderly parents that their son does not at all of the honest life that tells?

Sometimes a lie is a means of protection for a person who is lying. After all, the truth is not necessary in each case. Sometimes the truth is the only thing that can harm and even. In this case, the wiser, mercifully resort to lies, especially if there is hope that the truth will never know, and the lies can save someone's life.

What to choose - lie or truth?

The truth should be more preferable for all types of relationships: friendship, family, related bonds, business relations. It is true in life that is a saving for people in most situations, it allows you to create trusting relationships, to be open and honest, living in the world with yourself and with other people. But the saving strength of lying can also be noted for some situations. It is impossible to destroy families or friendship with one carelessly spoken word only because the word is truthfully. Leave events in the past, to forget the insults, silent about some troubles - this is also a part of human life, which allows people to stay together for a long time.

A person himself must evaluate each situation and make a decision, as best, kindly and mercifully enter each specific case: tell the truth or hide it. After all, it is important not only to always be absolutely true and honest, but also to be, first of all, a kind and wise man, not harm the other, but to do everything for his good.

Keywords

annotation scientific article on philosophy, ethics, religion, author of scientific work - Medeb Gleb Nikolaevich

In this article, the author considers the problem of lies through the prism of the model situation proposed by Crate in the treatise "about the imaginary right to lie from humanity", the discussion of which in 2008 became a catalyst in the Russian ethical discussion space. In everyday life, we are usually guided by the logic of common sense, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it is very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality, when it is necessary to preserve the moral dignity of the individual. Nevertheless, uncompromising in everyday life may not be tactful or even heartlessly. Therefore, the requirement of Kant and his supporters to speak the truth, and nothing but the truth, in any situation, even when the attacker, having hidden in your friend's house, asks about his location, does not correspond to ordinary moral intuition. For Cant, the main value is the internal integrity and the moral autonomy of the subject, closed only on himself, on its new, universal human base. A brief excursion to the specification and typology of regulatory and ethical absolutism, undertaken by the author, allows you to determine the position of Kant and its supporters as abstract absolutism. At the same time, according to the author, the rejection of the tough position of the abstract absolutism on the problem of lies does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of absolutism in general, which is demonstrated as part of the analysis of alternative Cantian regulatory and ethical positions A. Gevirta and N. Gaisler. In conclusion, the author relates to the possibility of combining a negative-absolutist and positive-consequencyline position within a single and consistent regulatory-ethical doctrine.

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The Author Analyzes The Approach To The We Essay "On the Alleged Right to Lie from Philanthropy" Which Caused A ViVid Discussion in Russian Ethics. In Everyday Life We Usually Guided by The Logic Of Common Sense and We Are Constantly Focused On Searching for Compromises. Theraefore, IT IS Very Difficult to Switch to Another Logic - The Logic of Uncompromising Moality WHEN IT IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. Nonetheless, IT May Be Heartless to Follow The Unconditional Imperatives of Formal Morality in Usual Life. Obviously, The Kantian Commitment to Tell Nothing But The Truth In Any Situation Contradicts Intuitions of Commonsense Morality. The Main Value for Kant Is The Integrity and Moral Autonomy of the Subject, Focused Only On Himself, His Noumenal and Panhuman Basis. A Brief Excurse Into The Specification and Typology of Ethical Absolutism Taken by The Author Allows Determining The Position of Kant and His Followers AS An Abstract Absolutism. AT The Same Time, The Rejection of Abstract Absolutist Approach to the Issue of Lie Does Not Necessarily Lead To the Rejection of Absolutism in General, As It Is Demonstrated in General Positions of A. Gewirth and N. Geisler. In Conclusion, The Author Poses The Question of the Deontological and Consequentialistic Possibility and Consequentialistic Position Within A Coherent Normative Doctrine.

Text of scientific work on the topic "Moral absolutism and a false lie"

Ethical thought

Volume 16. No. 1/2016. P. 130-143

Ethical Thought Vol. 16. NO 1/2016, PP. 130-143 DOI: 10.21146 / 2074-4870-2016-16-1-130-143

G.Mamechad

Moral absolutism and false

Mehed Gleb Nikolaevich - Candidate of Philosophy; E-mail: [Email Protected]

In this article, the author considers the problem of lies through the prism of the model situation proposed by Crate in the treatise "about the imaginary right to lie from humanity", the discussion of which in 2008 became a catalyst in the Russian ethical discussion space. In everyday life, we are usually guided by the logic of common sense, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it is very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality, when it is necessary to preserve the moral dignity of the individual. Nevertheless, uncompromising in everyday life may not be tactful or even heartlessly. Therefore, the requirement of Kant and his supporters to speak the truth, and nothing but the truth, in any situation, even when the attacker, having hidden in your friend's house, asks about his location, does not correspond to ordinary moral intuition. For Cant, the main value is the internal integrity and the moral autonomy of the subject, closed only on himself, on its new, universal human base. A brief excursion to the specification and typology of regulatory and ethical absolutism, undertaken by the author, allows you to determine the position of Kant and its supporters as abstract absolutism. At the same time, according to the author, the rejection of the tough position of the abstract absolutism on the problem of lies does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of absolutism in general, which is demonstrated as part of the analysis of alternative Cantian regulatory and ethical positions A. Gevirta and N. Gaisler. In conclusion, the author applies to the possibility of combining a negative-absolutist and position-consequencyline position within a single and consistent regulatory and ethical doctrine.

Keywords: ethics, moral absolutism, deontology, consequencyline, lie, Immanuel Kant, Abdusalax Huseynov, Alan Gevirt, Norman Gacel

Discussion of the situation simulated by Kant in the essay "On the imaginary right to lie from humanity", in 2008 provoked a large-scale discussion among ethics professionals, which with varying degrees continues until now. This discussion made it possible to maximally clarify the regulatory and ethical positions of the researchers themselves and divided them into two unequal camps. The minority amounted to apologists

1 On the right to lie / ed. R.G. Apresian. M., 2011. © Medered G.N.

Kant, most are his opponents. The arguments and those and others were quite diverse, however, under the clue, it should be recognized that this discussion fully fits into the conceptual framework of the opposition of absolutists, deontologists and consequencyalists, which in English-speaking ethics continues from the 60s. XX century To the Russian specifics of this discussion, it can be attributed to the historical and philosophical character - one way or another, its participants focused on the discussion of the Kantian example. Many opponents of Kant on the basis of the analysis of his works expressed the opinion that the Great Koenigsbergenets contradicts himself, while apologists argued the opposite and called upon to explore and understand the general philosophical parcels from which Kant came, resorting again to the historical and philosophical study of his texts .

In general, such a historical and philosophical color seems to me not quite the right way to produce and discuss the problem. The merit of Kant is that he extremely sharpened the question of the last limit of morality, about the very zone of transition from compromise to uncompromising logic. Therefore, it doesn't matter how successively the Kant himself in other works adhered to the position expressed by him in this essay. However, it seems to me that the position of Kant in general is an adequate expression of all his teachings. It corresponds to the deep settings of his ethics, which will be mentioned in more detail below. Nevertheless, the importance of this discussion is not for me that it allows "to appear" in Cant in inconsistency, but in the fact that it raises the question of the nature and essence of moral absolutes in general, as well as those forms in which they are presented in The structure of moral consciousness.

In my opinion, Kant and those who are supported in this particular case, not quite right - homeowner should lie to the attacker to save a friend. But this does not mean that all those who oppose Cant are right. The sharp discrepancy of Kant with moral intuition is due to its regulatory position of abstract absolutism, which, as I have already noted, in general, corresponds to the general logic of its ethics.

Many of the ethical codes of different cultures along with the ban on the killing of innocent and theft also contain a ban on a lie. It is not an exception and a Judeo-Christian tradition, under the influence of which modern Western civilization was formed. However, in all of all situations it is necessary to comply with this ban? After all, it happens that lies can save someone's life or harmonize interpersonal relationships. In everyday life, we constantly go on a compromise with your conscience and break the ban on false, without even thinking about it. The ability to find a compromise and feel the borders in which this compromise is appropriate, we believe as one of the main properties of an educated, respectable person. Actually, Aristotle's teachings about virtue as the ability to find the golden middle means nothing but the ability to find a compromise justified from a moral point of view.

Thus, the basic ethical prohibitions - do not kill, do not fight, do not lie, do not commit adultery, etc. - in itself are quite abstract and their use in real, everyday life is mediated by many "but" and different

mi reservations. As R. Hair noted, "Recovery of morality" is impossible without developing the ability to specify abstract prescriptions and reminds this process of driving a car driving, also associated with the ability to apply abstract rules to specific situations, understanding those borders, within which these rules are appropriate.

In everyday life, we are usually guided by the logic of common sense, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it is very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality. From the point of view of the ordinary logic of the least resistance, to which we are all accustomed to, uncompromising morality seems to be something irrational-romantic and even heroic.

It should, however, recognize that sometimes such heroism is required in order to preserve human dignity and freedom. Guided by the logic of compromises, people can turn into Nazi war criminals, organizers and accomplices of massacres. For example, as it was in the case of Franz Stand, whom the path of small daily compromises with evil ultimately led to the post of Commandant of the Tskilka concentration camp. It wasly following the logic of compromises Soviet citizens in the era of Stalin's terror and repression wrote from each other and publicly renounced their parents announced by the enemies of the people. Guided by the logic and morality of the compromise, millions of German citizens indifferently looked at the injury of the Jews and denied them to refuge, while few hid them, rejecting the compromise with Nazism often at the cost of their own life. Experiments S. Milgrim4 on submission to authority and Stanford-sky prison experiment F. Zimbardo 5 visually demonstrated how far in a non-standard situation is able to make an ordinary man logic and moral compromises.

It is important to note that compromise morality usually begins with lies. Moreover, this lie is so natural that it is often not even realized, actually transforming in self-deception. If you can imagine the most banal of all angry, then this will be false. If a lie is repeated from day to day, it becomes something necessary, without which one cannot exist. The lies penetrate into the language itself, as shown in the novel of Orwell "1984". It is with lies that all totalitarian systems began. And it was the rejection of lies and false ideology that often became the cause of the decay of these totalitarian regimes. A courageous and decisive refusal of widespread lies became the main weapon of the struggle against totalitarianism in Czechoslovakia, the main element of the non-violent strategy developed by Vaclav Gavel.

Nevertheless, the uncompromising in everyday life can be, at least, not tactfully or even heartlessly. Therefore, such a counterintative seems to be the requirement of Kant to speak the truth, and nothing except the truth, in any situation, even when the attacker, presets

Hare R.M. The Language of Morals. Oxford, 1960. P. 76.

See: Tereshchenko. Such a fragile cover of humanity. Banality of evil, banality of good. M., 2010. P. 67-94.

Milgram S. obedience to authority. N.Y., 1974.

Zimbardo F. Effect of Lucifer: Why good people turn into villains. M., 2013.

the friend hiding in your home, asks about his whereabouts. A supporter of Kant may say - why is it important for us to consent to moral intuition? Does the philosopher look around for everyday consciousness, isn't it just necessary to listen to the voice of common sense, who stubbornly tells us that the sun revolves around the Earth? However, here it is possible to argue that regulatory ethics is only rationalization and systematization of primary moral installations and intuitions. Rationalization and systematization occur no on the basis of pure mind, from itself with universal laws (this is impossible in principle, as Gödel showed), and on the basis of the most intuitions and installations that exist in language, culture, etc. and which are constituted Primary material for moral reflection. Rationalization can complement or clarify the existing moral installations and emotions, but it should not turn into their refutation or unnatural radicalization, as it occurs in Kant, because it blurs the basics of moral thinking.

Kant comes from the logic of the ideal situation - the perfect world is impossible lies. But the ideal world is impossible and such a situation in which an attacker will pursue someone. In the ideal world of embodied morality, strictly speaking, morality as reflection in general becomes unnecessary, because the ability to make evil is disappearing with due. It should be remembered that the desire to adjust the reality under the scheme, the idea, theory is the main temptation of philosophers of all times and peoples. In many same philosophers, the criticism of the proper and - the dramatic consciousness of the utopicity of their buildings - leads to total denial of reality. As a result, the philosophical theory loses its relationship with reality, and the reality that the theory is called to "clarify", "order" or "supplement", is replaced by its fictional model. Very often, this happens in practical philosophy, with the result that this most philosophy does generally lose touch with practice. Yes, Kant is right when he says that the goodwill exists regardless of whether she ever has been implemented in history. But this kind will should be proportionated to the human dimension. Otherwise, the essence of morality is her human, humanistic essence - evaporates.

However, back to the problem of compromises in morality. How to identify those situations how to outline the zone in which you need to get out of the daily logic of compromise morality and "switch" to the logic of uncompromising morality to keep the human appearance? By and large, the rationale for the presence of such a zone of transition from compromise to uncompromising logic (and not at all alone with an insistent statement of uncompromising logic) and moral absolutism differs from moral relativism. To be absolutist, it is not necessary to be a rigorist, as some participants in the discussion on the admissibility of lies are considered for the benefit of the Kantian essay. That is, it is not necessary to firmly oppose the importance and proper, sufficiently recognition of the presence in the immenseness of a certain zone due. In other words, with Crate in his example, not only a consequencyline, but also absolutist may not agree. However, in order to understand how it may be, it is necessary to consider more, what is moral absolutism.

In the most general form, moral absolutism claims that the boundary between the good and evil of Constant and is unconditional in all possible worlds. This border itself can be established with the help of a universal principle, but in the final normative form it acquires the form of a simple prohibition, which does not depend on social, natural or other external conditions. For example, a person's murder is a moral evil under any circumstances, in any situation and at all times, and the confession of the murder of the absolute evil is a minimal condition of good. In contrast to absolutism, relativism claims that the constant border between good and evil does not exist, that the boundaries between these concepts are dynamically changing and their value is determined by the context of a particular situation.

The deontological approach, traditionally closely connected with absolutism, suggests that from a moral point of view, not so much the consequences of a deed, how much act itself as such, whatever its possible consequences and any "hypothetical" reasons. In this regard, the intrinsic value is often said about the internal value (INTRINSIC VALUE), which is not directly related to its external value, which is determined by the consequences. As noted by Ch. Frid, deontology instead of the concept of "good" prefers to operate with such concepts as "due" and "short" 6. These concepts outline the borders of morality, which do not coincide with the borders of the empirical world, they "are the grounds of our moral personality" 7, the terms of our existence as reasonable beings.

For the consequencyalist (teleological) approach, as a whole, an assessment of a deed from the point of view of its foreseen result is, that is, not so much the act itself, how many consequences, to which he led and the context of the situation in which the choice is made. In other words, consequencyalism proceeds from the fact that it is "goals, and not the means define morality" 8 and constitute its essence. The act corresponding to the debt, but which led to negative consequences is estimated within the framework of the consequencyalist approach as a whole negatively. This does not mean that consequencyline, in contrast to deontology, is focused only on the "external" value determined by the consequences; However, the concept of "internal" value of consequencyline attributes only a certain state of affairs in the world9. Therefore, as noted by T. Agel, consequencyline "is predominantly concerned about what happens", while "absolutism is mainly concerned about the fact that it (moral subject. - G.M.) does" 10.

It should be distinguished by the "weak", the non-allowist version of deontology from the "strong", i.e. the absolutist. With the substantiation of its position, the first can appeal to some other, optionally consequenzia-list conditions. For example, distinguishing different meanings of the moral demand - the murder of innocent is always evil, but murder within

Fried C. Right and Wrong As Absolute // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. Lanham

1994. P. 73-92. IBID. P. 74. IBID.

Williams B. A CRITIQUE OF CONSEQUENIALISM // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. Lanham

1994. P. 93-107.

Nagel T. War and Massacre // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. P. 218.

self-defense or during the protection of someone from aggression is not a murder and can even be presented as moral debt. Thus, non-allowor deontologists still determine the fulfillment of a moral ban. In other words, absolutism appeals to categorically as a significant characteristic of the moral demand11. Speaking by the Can-Tovsky language, from the point of view of absolutism, the subjective Maxim Action should be determined only by an objective form of the law itself. And although such a question is disputed by even some absolutists, it expresses the internal ideal of absolutism, its essential intention12.

In general, the strategy of a deontological approach (and "strong", and "weak" versions) lies in the disavavation of a consequencyalist approach by appeal to simple moral intuitions and proof that utilitarian or any other supporter of consequencyline in its de sacralization of moral prohibitions is ready to go So far that the border between evil and good will lose any meaning.

The argument of consequencyalists largely repeats the strategy of absolutists, but with a minus sign. An appeal to intuition is unchanged, only big perseverance is added in the calls to follow common sense. It should be noted that because of its sympathies to absolutism with its dualistic ontology, even the "weak" version of the deontual approach has always arose difficulties with the analysis of the so-called "difficult cases", which in many of the opponents were developed and in which rigid (or relatively tough) Binding to the demand of the unconditional moral cruise has always led to absurd and conflicts with common sense and simple moral intuition. It is in the context of the discussion of numerous "difficult cases" and moral dilemmas - in the form of constructed mental experiments or real cases - and the controversy between modern consequencylists and absolutists is being built, which determines its originality.

A hard case is a Kantian example with a man hiding from a friend from an attacker, although Kant, most likely, would not agree with such a interpretation. Its example aims to illustrate the degree of unconditional categorical imperative - even in a risk situation for life (friend or acting person), it is necessary to tell the truth. From a modern point of view, the example of Kant looks like a mental experiment, delivered to verify the theory - whether the regulatory theory matches our moral intuition. It is curious that the author of this mental experiment is absolutist, and not a consequencylist, and, therefore, this mental experiment should serve as not to refute absolutism, but an illustration that, even in this case, absolute morality retains its potential and internal coherence.

What are Kant's motives when he approves the duty of truthfulness? Kant comes from the concept of an autonomous personality, for which internal integrity and its own infallibility is more expensive than the benefit of another person entrusted

11 FRIED C. Right and Wrong As Absolute. P. 76.

12 However, absolutism may vary on the issue of the regulatory limits of this categorical. Is all moral norms absolute or only some of them, and maybe, in general, only one of them?

his. Its position is extremely formalistic and legalized. As quite accurately notes M. Tereshchenko, according to Kant, "self-esteem, self-esteem inherent to a person who speaks as a moral subject, as a superfluential" mind ", is born through denial, humiliation of the real empirical, specific individuality, which defines human originality" 13 . Kant seen the basis of morality in the refusal of empirical individuality, which leads to the recognition of the illusion of the framework and boundaries between the subjects and the approval of a single, universal will as a nadindividual source of moles, morality metasub. Only such a metasuby will is autonomous, and only to the extent that it is universal. Thus, this autonomous will is simultaneously the subject, and the object of its legislation.

This means that in ethics of Cant, moral obligations and responsibility arise only in the space of the abstract and purely logical space of the universal law, where all specific "I" merge into one collective, but only logical subjectivity. The problem is that Kant, not being a mystic, attributed to this logical metasubeness of the ability of desire, which contradicted the entire installation of the critical draft of his philosophy. Kant saw him important in moral consciousness, indeed to some extent inherent in him, the ability to rise above the individual, group, and even national interest, rising to the level of abstract and universal principles. But Kant absolisted this ability, by ascribing it in addition to an important formal-structuring role, which it really performs, also the ability to assume a certain regulatory content and even the ability of unity. His model of morality is not egoistic, but, as M. Tereshchenko notes, Solip-Systskaya14 - Everything is measured for it only in relation to the inner integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, closed only on itself, on its new metasubjective, universal basis (humanity as such ). Therefore, the benefit of another person for Kant is not such a big moral problem.

The main apologist of Kant in the discussion on the admissibility of lies in the situation described by the German philosopher is Academician A.A. Huseynov15. Why is Kant's Huseynov's approach and is it possible to attribute its own concept of negative ethics, which is the same type of moral absolutism as the concept of Cant? The main axiom, which is based on the logic of Huseynov's argument, is that morality is the sphere of individually responsible thinking, what applies only to the person he himself as such, forms its deep base. Since only my own consciousness is available to me, it is responsible for any event (act) I can only be in the case when I am the only reason for it. I can't and should not judge others, I can judge only myself and about myself. Similar logic immediately cuts out the possibility

13 Tereshchenko M. Such a fragile cover of humanity. Banality of evil, banality of good. P. 268.

14 there. P. 266.

15 Huseynov A.A. What did Kant say, or why a lie is impossible for good // about the right to lie / ed. R.G. Apresian. P. 108-127.

any public, collective morality in the sense of something united and the whole. Public morality is extremely out of the amount of individual "morals".

With such a formulation of the problem, within the framework of which morality is taken in its perfect purity - which, of course, reminds the approach of the Kant - the region of specific moral responsibility can be only the motives of actions. Even the actions themselves in the area that concerns their implementation in practice are removed from the region of morality. This area of \u200b\u200bHuseynov calls a zone of special responsibility by borrowing this term at Bakhtin. Therefore, the only form of a truly moral act for him is a negative act. Only a negative act can be fully in the area of \u200b\u200bfreedom of the will of the personality, since it is always possible to abandon the accomplishment of any act - as long as the act is not performed. Thus, based on a certain descriptive characteristic of moral consciousness - the personality's ability to fully and fully respond to his act, to be its only reason - Huseynov builds all the logic of its theoretical position and regulatory ethics. Such a position is indeed very close to the type of moral absolutism, to which the ethics of Kant belongs.

As for Kant, the moral absolutism is embodied for Huseynov not so much in the sphere of acts of acts, which is, as directed exclusively to the ideal due, to establish the absolute border between good and evil. Therefore, it is not so important, what is the real empirical subject of the act - it is important to its attitude towards this act as a moral subject. The empirical subject is thus not coincided with the moral subject. And this is the cooler of the world to properly and existing, as well as the subject itself - on the moral and empirical - is a characteristic feature of moral absolutism at all.

From this absolutist logic flows a kind of attitude to those situations when you have to choose a smaller evil. This choice, on Huseynov, is not at all in the region of morality. In a situation of choosing a greater or smaller evil, a person is forced to be guided by some other, not moral motives, and therefore it is not his responsible choice, is not the competence of moral responsibility. The essence of the position of Huseynov can be formulated like this: it is not necessary to call a good evil just because it seems smaller compared to great. It is such a call to evil, albeit smaller, good, in Huseynov, is a moral relativism, that is, the position, according to which good and evil - interconnecting concepts, the boundaries between which dynamically change depending on the context, the situation. Therefore, if a person has to kill for self-defense or in war, it does not mean that he makes good, and precisely because good cannot be determined positively.

On the one hand, such a position allows you to add "Topos Uranios" morally, in which the identity is identical to itself, is God almost literally, a nonmetaforic sense. In such an understanding, the great rational-critical tradition of European philosophy is embodied. On the other hand, such an understanding of morality, as in Kant, in my opinion,

com Abstract. It is almost complete sterility. As in Kant, Huseynov has a splitting of the subject on the moral and empirical, while the moral subject turns out to be deprived of something private, individual. This is an abstract subject, humanity as the kingdom of goals by itself, the subject, which is present in each person equally. However, the postulation of such an abstract, nadudividual or even "meta-subject" (supersublectic) source is fraught with the loss of "humanifier" morality. Why is such a metasube, having a niggenevian "look from nowhere" and the main characteristic of which is the disinterest, should be judged from the position of precisely human interests, if they understand them, first of all, the desire for good and justice? Why not to put on the point of view of the Universal Law or a certain absolute spirit? It is for the confrontation of such a top-abstractioning interpretation of Kant introduced the second practical principle of a categorical imperative, which assumes the most moral agent as the highest value and asking exactly the "human-term" status of morality, and Huseynov introduces a ban on murder and lies. However, even with such a limitation, it remains possible to interpret the highest value of the moral agent as due precisely by the adherence to the moral law, to the new world, and not as a holistic being, the inhabitant, including the phenomenal world.

But how to be in the case of the conflict of two equal prohibitions? Obviously, a certain complexity arises here, a certain conflict with life practice and moral intuition. Regarding that many supporters of consistent absolutism in such a situation resort to non-completely transparent argumentation, verbal manipulations and implicit compromises with common sense. So, S. Harris, a consistent critic of all kinds of "White Lies", disassembled the Kantian example, insists on the need to say the truth even in a similar situation and at the same time it is generally aggravated by the aggressor. (How? For example, in a cowboy scum in a trellis of the revolver. True, Harris does not specify what to do those who have no revolver). Very reluctant Harris, however, recognizes the possibility of lies, but only as a last resort, if you are too weak physically or not so favorable to neutralize the aggressor. "But this does not mean it at all," said Harris, "that someone else, more courageous and smart, could not get off with the help of truth" 17. It should be recognized that the position of Huseynova is much more strict and consistent. The lies have a lie, and once recognizing it morally unacceptable, we must forever exclude it from their repertoire of practical funds.

Nevertheless, a positive solution to the problem of conflict of responsibilities, in my opinion, is not necessarily due to the abandonment of the absolutist position. For some reason, in the minds of most researchers, it is the Kant model of abstract absolutism, with which, obviously, is solidified by A.A. Huseynov, associated with moral absolutism as such. Although in the history of ethics there were attempts to build fundamentally different types of absolute

16 Nagel T. THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE. Oxford, 1986.

17 Harris S. Fali. Why tell the truth is always better. M., 2015. P. 51.

lyutyma, which is based on a non-closed formal structure, but a hierarchical model. To representatives of such a "hierarchical", or, it is better to say, "concrete", absolutism can be attributed to F.M. Dostoevsky, M. Sheer and A. Switzer, and among modern philosophers - A. Gevirta and N. Gacel.

A. Gevirt prefers to discuss the moral admissibility in extreme situations prohibited in the normal circumstances of the actions not in terms of absolute prohibitions, but absolute rights. "The right is absolutely when it cannot be canceled under any circumstances, that is, it can never be violated substantially and must be respected without any exceptions" 18, "he writes Gevirt. As a universal criterion for the validity of moral claims that correlated with rights, Hevirt offers the "Principle of General Coherence" (The "Principle of Generic Consistency", PGC) developed by it "PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY", PGC). Basic rights, according to this principle, are the necessary conditions of the act. In the event of a conflict of rights, priority according to PGC must be given in favor of the right, the execution of which is more necessary for action or a deed. As the most likely "candidate" on the role of the right to the top of the hierarchy, according to the philosopher, is entitled to life (by the recipient). As its correlation from the moral agent, negative debt of abstinence from human killing.

At the same time, Gevirt conducts a fundamental difference between "specific absolutism", the proponent of which it is, and "abstract absolutism." The latter, from the point of view of Gevirta, is more concerned about the guilt or innocence of a moral agent, while concrete absolutism focused more on "basic rights". Specific absolutism in assessing actions must necessarily take into account their consequences, but its consequencyline is not absolute, but is limited by the basic rights arising from PGC and which cannot be violated under any circumstances.

It is curious that, in contrast to the dual-effect doctrine, which GE Wirth criticizes, he does not conduct a categorical difference between negative and positive duties. The latter are no less absolute, if they concern basic rights. Therefore, from the point of view of Gevirta, in the example of Kant from the treatise "On the estimated right to lie from humanity", it is necessary to lie to the attacker, because the right to the truth, to which the criminal appeals is less fundamental than the right to life that the friend risks.

Although another English-American philosopher, N. Heisler is a supporter of the so-called "theory of the Divine Command" (Divine Command Theory), its regulatory-ethical position can be described as a deontology, more specified - as "hierarchical absolutism" or, by analogy with The approach of Gevirta, "specific absolutism". The essence of his ideas about how to avoid conflicts between moral absolutes, comes down to the proposal to build them into the hierarchy in the degree of conceptual proximity to

18 GEWIRTH A. Are there Any Absolute Rights? // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. P. 129-146; 130.

he is a source (God). It is significant as the heisler, and Hevirt insist on the use of the term "absolute" even to the lower members of the Absolutov vertical. "Each moral law," heisler writes, is absolute in its field. For example, false as such is always wrong. However, when a collision is charged with the duty to save life for the principle of truth, an exception is made, although even then the obligation of truthfulness remains in force "19. The geisler illustrates this on an example with a magnet - although the power of electromagnetic interaction is many times stronger than gravitational, electromagnetism does not exceed the gravity force, but rather temporarily suspends.

It seems to me that if we proceed from an absolute ban on killing as a certain axiomatic point, the erosion of which threatens the destruction of the whole logic of morality, but at the same time, only a negative "base" for a positive consequencyalistic superstructure, as Gevirt and Gacels are offered, we can go to active Approval of the value of human life and its needs as the highest, nothing to be remedicated by the good. Such synthesis of negative and positive ethics in the concept of concrete absolutism, in my opinion, is quite possible.

Both paths individually have their advantages and their drawbacks. In the case of positive ethics, we have a too vague criterion, which is fairly easy to manipulate. In the case of negative ethics, we only have the absolute boundary between good and evil, but not yet good; This border becomes clean only in an extreme, catastrophic situation. In other words, negative ethics determines the border of mankind in general, it means what makes us people, but does not yet give us a universal criterion of good and evil for everyday life at the family level, the team where consequency-compromise logic is most often required.

In addition, there is another problem: whether the deception in the simulated Cant of the situation is only morally possible and justified by a smaller evil, as K. Corsgaard20 believes, or is it necessary for it from a moral point of view and is required? In other words, should Moral authorize false in this situation as good? Gevirta turns out that a lie in this situation is announced a positive duty. The need to paint looks precisely as a moral necessity, the debt of the moral agent. However, does this not mean the authorization of lies as moral good - even in the framework of the situation alone? This is the problem - and the task for the future for those moralists who would like to make the synthesis of absolutism and consequencyline.

H. Rant with its inherent fineness once noticed an interesting correlation between the ideas of Kant and Dostoevsky21. Both saw in a lie began the beginning of evil, because it was a lie - first of all a lie to myself, his inner voice of conscience - makes it possible all kinds of evil, murder, betrayal. "Unfair," writes Kant, - there is a lack of conscientiousness, i.e. clarity

19 Geisler N. Any Absolutes? Absolutely! // Christian Research Institute, 2009, April 17th. URL: http://www.equip.org/articles/any-bsolutes-bsolutely-/ (Date of handling: 07/20/2014)

20 Corsgaardm.c. The Right to Lie: Kant On Dealing With Evil // Deontology / Ed. by S. Darwall. 2003. P. 212-235.

21 Rent H. Some issues of moral philosophy // Rent H. Responsibility and judgment. M., 2013. P. 100.

recognition before your inner judge "22. As close to the teachings of Zosi and to the position of Huseynov: "The main thing is not to lie yourself. Lying himself and his own lie listened before it reaches that there is no truth in itself, it does not distinguish between anything, but it becomes in disrespect and to another "23. How could the crime of Raskolnikov? First of all, at the expense of permanent lies, Skolnikova himself - he tried to deceive himself.

Thus, the pathos of moral absolutism in relation to the principle of truthfulness, from my point of view, should not be at all to lie or not lie when it is necessary to prevent the death of a person - when the horse is human life, you need to do everything possible to save it , including, of course, lie - but not to replace the concepts, calling a smaller evil good, as A.A. warns about it Huseynov. Evil, albeit less, should remain evil. And when it is necessary to choose between the smaller and greater evil, the act of choice in favor of a smaller evil due to necessity should not be declared good to benefit. Otherwise, this will be a lie, besides the worst - lie to yourself, a lie of the compromise morality in an uncompromising situation. Probably, the only way to avoid slipping on the inclined plane of the evil is to use compromise-consequencyalist and uncompromising-absolutist logic in parallel, i.e., constantly checking your genuine motifs and check their high standard of absolute morality, constantly aware of their lies as a lie, allowing it only There and then, when it is really less evil.

Partly such an approach where the absolute of the basics provides a deontol-hymical level, and the effectiveness and flexibility against live practices - consequencyalist, resembles the principle of "two-level theory", described by K. Corsgaard24. Corsgaard managed to show how with the help of this principle, the ethics of Kant can be supplemented in such a way that the formula of the universal law would provide the "point in which morality becomes uncompromising" 25. In other words, this mechanism allows us to mediate the relationship between the existing and due both between the present and the future, set the absolute morality as an ideal, albeit a utopian target. At the same time, this goal does not hide somewhere as a certain abstraction in itself and for itself, but is in constant "dialogue" with reality, asks its regulatory borders and meaning. It seems to me that only such moral wakefulness and constant reflection when referring to the deontological level of ethics are able to prevent the use of compromise logic of a smaller evil in situations requiring switching to uncompromising logic, which means to maintain the free human individuality and responsible moral entity.

22 Kant I. Metaphysics of morality // Kant I. Op. On him. and rus. Yaz: in 4 tons / ed. N. Motroshilova, B. Tuschling. T. 3. M., 1997. P. 824.

23 Dostoevsky F.M. Karamazov brothers // Dostoevsky F.M. Cathedral So: at 15 t. T. 9. L., 1991. P. 50.

24 cristine M. Corsgaard. The Right to Lie: Kant On Dealing WITH EVIL. R. 235.

25 ibid. P. 231.

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MORAL ABSOLUTISM AND NOBLE LIE

Phd in philosophy; E-mail: [Email Protected]

The Author Analyzes The Approach To The We Essay "On the Alleged Right to Lie from Philanthropy" Which Caused A ViVid Discussion in Russian Ethics. In Everyday Life We Usually Guided by The Logic Of Common Sense and We Are Constantly Focused On Searching for Compromises. Theraefore, IT IS Very Difficult to Switch to Another Logic - The Logic of Uncompromising Moality WHEN IT IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. Nonetheless, IT May Be Heartless to Follow The Unconditional Imperatives of Formal Morality in Usual Life. Obviously, The Kantian Commitment to Tell Nothing But The Truth In Any Situation Contradicts Intuitions of Commonsense Morality. The Main Value for Kant Is The Integrity and Moral Autonomy of the Subject, Focused Only On Himself, His Noumenal and Panhuman Basis. A Brief Excurse Into The Specification and Typology of Ethical Absolutism Taken by The Author Allows Determining The Position of Kant and His Followers

aS An Abstract Absolutism. AT The Same Time, The Rejection of Abstract Absolutist Approach to the Issue of Lie Does Not Necessarily Lead To the Rejection of Absolutism in General, As It Is Demonstrated in General Positions of A. Gewirth and N. Geisler. In Conclusion, The Author Poses The Question of the Deontological and Consequentialistic Possibility and Consequentialistic Position Within A Coherent Normative Doctrine.

Keywords: Ethics, Moral Absolutism, Deontology, Consequentialism, Lie, Immanuel Kant, Abdusalam Guseinov, Alan Gewirth, Norman Geisler

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